<aside> ‼️ Please Note: We share this information with the hope that it aids pro-democracy activists by highlighting specific process points to monitor for any subversive efforts. Due to the sensitivity of this information and the potential for it to be exploited by bad actors, this page and the links within it should not be shared outside of the pro-democracy community.
If you have any questions or feedback on these identified vulnerabilities, please contact us at info[at]informingdemocracy[dot]org
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Informing Democracy has reviewed the Nevada code, regulations, and the elections officials themselves in order to identify potential weaknesses in the election administration process.
With regard to process vulnerabilities, we have identified a number of areas where, although in spirit the law is sound, the legal framework has created vulnerabilities where a bad actor could take advantage and subvert or significantly delay post-election processes. Notably, counties have the discretion to hand count ballots instead of using tabulation equipment, though their plan for conducting this full hand count must be approved by the Secretary of State. We also note that provisions regarding gaps in audit regulations, and other powers held by local officials and voters, can result in the deliberate delay or subversion of an election.
Informing Democracy reviewed members of Nevada’s 17 County Boards of Commissioners and County Clerks to identify individuals with roles who could pose a threat to free and fair elections. Of the 91 public officials whose news mentions, social media, and official actions were reviewed, 30 had findings that raised concern—33% of officials reviewed by Informing Democracy. We identified officials with concerning findings in 11 of Nevada’s 17 Counties. For more, see Nevada Election Officials Findings.
Four counties contain cause for major concern for free and fair election administration this November, due to the willingness of their officials to subvert election administration or entertain and act on conspiracy theories from well-known election deniers like Jim Marchant and Robert Beadles:
Most election procedures in Nevada are prescribed by statute or by the Secretary of State. However, there are a few areas where the law either explicitly provides counties with local discretion—such as the discretion to conduct a hand count—or where there is a gap in the law that provides room for that discretion—such as in audits of non-VVPAT voting machines. This local discretion can be particularly problematic when local decisions are influenced by election deniers and conspiracy theorists. Notably, however, the risks are somewhat reduced because most areas of county discretion are also subject to approval and oversight by the Secretary of State.
Counties have discretion to choose to hand count ballots cast in elections, instead of using electronic equipment. “Election Procedures Manual”at 74. In comparison to counting ballots with electronic tabulators, hand counting is typically more prone to errors, more time consuming, more likely to violate the privacy of voters, and more of a strain on election administrators and resources.
Notably, in 2024 the Secretary of State issued guidelines that attempt to address some of these issues. In order to conduct a hand count, a county must submit a hand counting plan to the Secretary of State at least 90 days before an election. “High Court Rejects Plea.” The recently issued guidance outlines what must be included in that plan for it to be approved. This includes safeguards and contingency planning to ensure the process does not delay the canvass and certification processes and to preserve ballot secrecy. “Election Procedures Manual” at 75. Interestingly, the new guidance also allows counties to “use an electronic tabulator to validate the results of the hand count.” “Election Procedures Manual” at 74.
Nevertheless, there is some risk that a county might try to conduct a hand count outside of this oversight framework or push the boundaries of what is permissible here. In 2022, Nye County did just that. “ACLU vs. the County of Nye.” They submitted a hand count plan, but they did not wait for the Secretary of State’s approval before beginning their hand count in parallel with a machine count. This led to litigation and the court did require them to update their plan to comply with statutes surrounding the secrecy of election results before Election Day, but did not require them to stop their hand count process.
The impact of this litigation on future hand count attempts is hopefully limited. In this case, the court relied on the fact that Nye County eventually got permission from the Secretary of State to finish hand counting after they made it clear that hand review would not impact the timing or finalization of the official results via their machine count. Despite this, permission from the Secretary of State to conduct extralegal hand counts might not be determinative, as the court emphasized that the Secretary was not named in the lawsuit. “Order Denying Petition for Writ.” In addition, the court noted that they were not presented with any statute forbidding a parallel count. “Order Denying Petition for Writ.” Either way, the fact that Nye County got the full parallel hand count they wanted—by initially flouting the Secretary of State’s oversight framework and beginning their count without approval—might embolden a repeat in Nye or other counties.
For more information about the vulnerabilities involved in full hand counts see Language of Elections: Debunking Conspiracy Theories and False Claims. For more information about Nevada procedures regarding hand counting and for more details about new Secretary of State guidelines see Tabulation.